This paper aims at motivation and strength of financial transfers return to explore the validity of family pension. Using 2011 CHARLS baseline data, we calculate the financial return from children and parents early payment which is measured by children's education and marriage gift received from parents. Under the exchanging motivation, we explore strength of intergenerational transfer "return contract"; and we explore whether there is altruism factor in children return by controlling the current health status of the parents. This paper establishes a Tobit type II (ET2T) model, using Heckman two-step method, the results show that the family pension is in low amount, the parents receive 200 Yuan monthly in average, and the intensity of the "return contract" is not high, the altruistic factor of children return isn't significant. Therefore, from the view of financial return, the family pension plays a limited role in pension. In addition, the financial transfer's probability and amounts of sons are more than daughters; rural have large probability of family pension, but fewer amounts; children number's increase don't reduce the probability and amount of financial transfer:that is to say family pension level is proportional to the children number.
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