人口与经济

论社会医疗保险中的道德风险及其制度消解

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作者：王锦锦

单位：武汉大学社会保障研究中心, 湖北武汉 430072

关键词：道德风险;医疗保险;制度消解

分类号：F840.684

出版年,卷(期):页码：2007,28(3):62-66

摘要：

道德风险源于人的机会主义倾向,在社会医疗保险领域中积弊已久,主要表现为需求方的过度消费和供给方的诱导需求,其原因在于第三方支付效应、价格补偿效应和医疗伦理的异化。只有医、患、保三方进行制度创新才能对其有效消解。

Moral hazard originates in human beings' opportunism. There are mainly two types of moral hazards in social health insurance:the demand-side's excessive consumption and the supplier-induced demand. This paper argues that they result from the effects of the Third-party payment system, medical price reimbursement policies and the alienation from medical ethics. The clearing-up of them could be effectively achieved only through institutional innovation in hospitals, patients and insurance organizations.

基金项目：

作者简介：

王锦锦(1979-),男,河南襄城人。武汉大学社会保障研究中心博士生,主要从事医疗保障研究

参考文献：

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